How European leaders are responding to Trump’s approach to Ukraine and Europe
Europe is on the March. In the first week of the new month, European leaders took several notable steps on the continent’s security. On Sunday, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer hosted more than a dozen European leaders to discuss creating a “coalition of the willing” to support Ukraine. On Tuesday, the likely next German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, announced an agreement to overhaul German spending rules on defense. Then on Wednesday, French President Emmanuel Macron gave an impassioned national address on Europe’s security needs, which was followed on Thursday by a special meeting of the European Council in Brussels.
This packed schedule follows the tempestuous meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and US President Donald Trump on February 28—the latest indication of an emerging transatlantic rift over European security. Below, Atlantic Council experts walk us through what this eventful week revealed and what to expect next.
Sunday, March 2—The British prime minister hosts a leaders summit on Ukraine
On Sunday, Starmer convened eighteen leaders at Lancaster House in London for the “Securing Our Future” summit. (Fans of The Crown might recognize the site as the series’s major filming location.) Though the summit had been planned beforehand, it gained much greater geopolitical significance in the wake of last week’s disastrous Oval Office meeting. For Starmer (who had himself just returned from a much more successful visit to the White House) the summit served three purposes:
- Showing European solidarity and support for Ukraine and for Zelenskyy personally;
- Re-establishing the United Kingdom’s role as a major player in Europe’s strategic conversation and as a bridge to Washington; and
- Making tangible progress on providing Kyiv with diplomatic and military support.
Afterwards, Starmer announced the grouping as a new “coalition of the willing,” comprising sixteen heads of government plus the leaders of the European Union (EU) and NATO. This group agreed on a four-point plan as the basis for peace in Ukraine:
- Maintaining the flow of military aid to Ukraine and ramping up sanctions on Russia;
- Affirming that any peace must be lasting and negotiations must involve Ukraine;
- Enhancing Ukraine’s defense capabilities post-cease-fire to deter further aggression; and
- Developing this new coalition as a forum for driving continued progress.
The leaders emerged from the ornate corridors to commit to a Europe that steps up to the challenge of turning Ukraine, in European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s words, into an “indigestible steel porcupine” and a Europe that swiftly rearms after decades of underinvestment. As part of this, Starmer announced new spending, including roughly two billion dollars in air defense missile purchases for Ukraine, to be manufactured in Belfast.
Starmer has had a shaky start to his premiership, but he is evidently seizing this opportunity to redefine the central purpose of his government, and winning rare, broad-based support from across the British political spectrum in the process. On Thursday, his defense secretary, John Healey, visited the Pentagon to try and sustain this momentum.
—Philippe Dickinson is a deputy director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative (TSI) at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
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The most important takeaway from the London meeting is that Ukraine is not alone. European leaders demonstrated that they are stepping up—not just with words but with concrete proposals. Starmer and Macron, with their proposal for a European reassurance force and outlines of steps toward a temporary cease-fire, have seized the diplomatic initiative. This makes Europe an actor with agency.
The message from London was clear: Europe refuses to be a bystander while Washington dictates Ukraine’s fate. For the United Kingdom, this is a key post-Brexit moment with a lead role in shaping European resolve. It returns the United Kingdom to its traditional role of being a security shaper in Europe.
—Roderick Kefferpütz is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and the director of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union office in Brussels.
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The most important message was not the one communicated in London, but rather the one conveyed by the exclusion of the Baltic states from the meeting. Discussing the defense of Ukraine without the Baltic states—which, along with Denmark, represent the top four countries in terms of government support to Ukraine as a percentage of their gross domestic product (GDP)—feels highly inappropriate at the current moment. The Baltic states are also Europe’s most exposed frontline states and would be the first ones to defend Europe from Russian aggression, thus making them a crucial part of any considerations on European defense. Involving the eastern flank countries in such discussions is crucial for deterring Russia, which consistently attempts to argue that these nations are irrelevant in the larger power play. Europe is awakening, but it still needs to relearn not only rearmament but also strategic communication and messaging.
—Justina Budginaite-Froehly is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
Tuesday, March 4—German leaders announce changes to fiscal rules
The announcement by Merz that Germany would reform its much-fetishized, constitutionally enshrined debt brake to exempt military spending above 1 percent of GDP from its fiscally restrictive provisions on new debt is one of the most significant economic and security announcements in Europe in a decade.
The move—a stunning reversal from his own party’s campaign rhetoric and decades of German fiscal orthodoxy—could allow for major investments in closing defense capability and readiness gaps, provide long-term certainty for defense-industrial capacity, and bring Berlin’s defense spending closer to 3 percent of GDP. The announcement combines with a shift in Berlin’s posture in supporting von der Leyen’s joint borrowing proposal for a 150 billion euro EU defense fund and a relaxation of EU debt and deficit rules for defense spending purposes—both long anathema to Germany’s fiscal hawks.
This Zeitenwende 2.0 moment matters not only for Berlin but also Europe. Merz’s moves show that the likely next chancellor has understood the unprecedented geopolitical moment Germany and the continent are in—under threat from adversaries in Moscow and Beijing, and at risk of desertion from its ally in Washington. The framing and timing of these policy shifts a few days before the extraordinary European Council summit also suggest a new type of German leadership in Europe after years in which Germany was largely missing in action. Merz seems willing to think big and get creative on long-entrenched positions complete with necessary political maneuvering when stark realities make a reassessment necessary. And he appears to understand the impact that strategic messaging from Europe’s political and economic heavyweight can have—for allies and adversaries alike.
The effectiveness of Germany’s role going forward will depend on whether Merz and his future government can follow through on their bold proposals. Domestically, building the necessary two-thirds parliamentary majority for a constitutional change on a short timeline will be a first priority. But that’s just the beginning. Devising and implementing an effective defense and defense industrial strategy at home, coordinating with European partners, and managing the inflationary and debt-related repercussions across Europe while jump-starting its own ailing economy will be no small challenge for Germany’s next government.
—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.
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The negotiators of the potential new German government coalition, consisting of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), announced far-reaching plans to loosen the debt brake rules for the priority areas of defense and infrastructure modernization. The plan stipulates that all defense spending exceeding 1 percent of GDP would be exempt from Germany’s strict debt rule, thus allowing the country to plan for a long-term sustainable increase in defense spending. This, in turn, would send positive signals to the defense industry, enabling it to ramp up arms and ammunition production lines in an urgently needed effort to rearm Germany.
Regarding infrastructure modernization, the plan allocates 500 billion euros over ten years, with this amount also exempt from the debt brake. This crucial decision is likely to facilitate the upgrading of Germany’s dual-use infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, and railways, thereby strengthening its role as a key European hub for military logistics.
The new debt brake exemption plan, together with Germany’s urge to ease the EU’s fiscal rules to boost defense spending, marks a major shift in the country’s position on fiscal discipline. This can be seen as an important indicator of the incoming German government’s intention to bring Germany back into the strategic discussion about Europe’s security and defense.
—Justina Budginaite-Froehly
***
Under Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Germany often dithered on Ukraine, appearing uncertain and reactive. But with Merz, we are already seeing a different approach—one that could mark a fundamental shift in Germany’s role in Europe.
This is a seismic moment. Fiscal conservatism is deeply ingrained in German political DNA; Merz himself campaigned on it. Yet, he has now put forth proposals to allow for increases in defense spending without running afoul of Germany’s constitutional debt brake, create an infrastructure fund, and increase investments. Von der Leyen’s proposal to allow defense spending outside the EU’s fiscal rules constraints gives Berlin the space to act. When Europe’s largest economy starts moving, it’s a big deal—and good news for the continent’s ability to respond to geopolitical challenges.
But the real question is: How far will Germany go? Will it limit itself to fiscal flexibility and defense industrial policy, or will it make a deeper shift in its strategic culture? The United Kingdom and France are leading on Ukraine, with a proposed reassurance force. Will Germany step up and contribute? If Merz follows through, Germany could finally become the European player that many have long hoped for.
—Roderick Kefferpütz
Wednesday, March 5—The French president speaks to the nation
In his special address to the nation on Wednesday, Macron sought to outline and justify his answers to “a new era” of global uncertainty. The French president was speaking foremost to the French population, and his address carefully explained why Ukraine was instrumental to France’s and Europe’s security. This included graphics and images on the state of the “Russian existential threat” and the frontline. While saying he supported “any peace-driven agendas”—an only implicit reference to the US-Russia talks—Macron clarified that France would not accept any “abandonment of Ukraine” amid “declining American support” and uncertainty. Appealing to France’s values and history, Macron called for an all-encompassing national effort and outlined a positive agenda of prioritizing the reinforcement of national and European defense and reindustrialization. This address—in which tax increases were ruled out for now—was well received in much of the French press, and it will likely reinforce his political leverage against a hung parliament and a party weakened by an electoral defeat in 2024.
Perhaps most important was Macron’s statement that the “future of Europe cannot be settled in Washington or in Moscow.” The speech painted France’s long-standing aims of being the driving force of a more sovereign Europe, one that would emerge in a stronger position against its adversaries. At the same time, the French president sought to redefine the contours of a new transatlantic relationship. France has been at the forefront of proposing new solutions to gaps left by the US retreat from Europe from a political, economic, military, and industrial point of view. One of them is security guarantees, where the line of effort will continue this week with France hosting European joint staffs.
Finally, Macron recalled France’s “particular status” as a nuclear power while further underlining the European dimension of French vital interests. That statement reflects the overlapping nature of national and European security interests. This doctrine is not new. It rules out France sharing nuclear decision-making with other nations, as Macron clarified Wednesday night. But in the current context, Macron’s speech is a call for deeper discussions among France and other European nations.
—Léonie Allard is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, previously serving at the French Ministry of Armed Forces.
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The most far-reaching takeaway from Macron’s address to the nation was what it might suggest about the potential extension of the French nuclear deterrent to include other European nations as well. France and the United Kingdom are the only states in Europe possessing nuclear weapons, which they currently use solely for national deterrence. Other European NATO allies rely on the United States’ nuclear umbrella through NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangement. However, with the United States challenging its European allies with its increasingly transactional foreign and security policy, calls for a stronger European role in defense—including nuclear deterrence—are growing louder. Merz also raised this issue just before his election, indicating a possible significant shift in Germany’s stance on this matter.
The main conclusion from these developments is that we are potentially witnessing the dawn of a new era of not only novel experiments regarding nuclear arrangements in Europe but of nuclear proliferation in general.
—Justina Budginaite-Froehly
Thursday, March 6—European leaders meet in Brussels
In the European Council’s announcements on defense and Ukraine, we are seeing both the potential and limits of the European Union. Defense and security issues have been and remain the remit of member states. But when it comes to financing Europe’s much-needed rearmament, the EU is an obvious and important part of the solution to the funding needs of many member states. No one country has the capabilities to do this effort itself, and by working together with the EU’s twenty-seven members and leveraging the financial firepower of its institutions, such as the European Investment Bank, economies of scale can be achieved.
Analysts will slice and dice the EU-speak of the summit conclusions and look for big and small differences emerging from the closed-door conversations among leaders. But the scope and speed of agreement on controversial issues, such as joint borrowing for defense and more flexible debt and deficit rules to allow for greater military spending, are a significant strategic signal that Europe is stepping up to bolster its own security. The process is slow, technical, and bureaucratic. Many details still have to be negotiated. But it’s nothing shy of extraordinary that Europe has been moving so quickly on these proposals now.
On other big geopolitical questions such as Europe’s support for Ukraine, the limits of the EU are on full display with Hungary’s veto of any conclusions on Ukraine. In the current setup where unanimity rules, Hungary can and will continue to play spoiler. The EU’s twenty-six remaining members put out their own conclusions, complete with promises for further and predictable aid to Ukraine. But as long as Hungary abuses the veto system, the EU’s ambitions on Ukraine remain limited.
—Jörn Fleck
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The EU is finally stepping up through the ReArm Europe initiative, which von der Leyen outlined ahead of Thursday’s meeting in Brussels. This is an important step in providing member states with greater fiscal space for defense spending. However, while it alleviates some national budget constraints, it remains a limited measure. What the EU truly needs is a genuine European initiative that includes financing, stronger coordination, and a coherent industrial defense policy.
One of the most glaring inefficiencies in European defense remains the lack of interoperability. It is astonishing that different types of ammunition are being used for the same weapons systems, rendering them incompatible. This fragmentation weakens Europe’s ability to respond effectively to security threats and underscores the urgent need for standardization and joint procurement. Despite the growing momentum for deeper European defense cooperation, political spoilers such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico are likely to hinder progress at the EU level. As a result, much like the UK-France-led reassurance initiative, we may see a coalition of the willing emerge to push forward on European defense integration.
All eyes are now on the upcoming White Paper on European Security and Defense, which is expected to shape the EU’s strategic approach in the coming years.
—Roderick Kefferpütz
How should the US view these developments?
These developments should be welcomed in Washington. After decades of pushing for European allies to step up on defense, Washington should take note of the seriousness with which efforts are moving to approve the EU’s initiative to mobilize European joint borrowing, adapt debt rules to accommodate greater defense spending, and streamline procurement and cooperation.
Some in the US defense policy bubble will have their usual fits about a Europe that answers the United States’ call for it to take greater responsibility but does so through the European Union rather than NATO. But there should be much to Washington’s liking in this EU effort. Cohesion and complementarity with NATO goals are mentioned throughout the Council’s conclusions, and many European allies, especially on the frontlines, will push for this for strategic reasons of keeping NATO and the United States engaged. Depending on the exact terms, the US defense industry is also likely to benefit from an expanding defense pie. What Washington won’t get is European allies that pay and do more for their own defense but don’t demand the adequate say for greater burden-sharing.
The Trump administration can take some credit for having pushed Europe’s actions and ambitions. But the White House should also note the deep frustration from across Europe with the idea of US abandonment—not just of Ukraine but of the transatlantic alliance.
—Jörn Fleck
***
This is a watershed moment for the US-European partnership. Not only does the relationship need to be rebuilt under a fundamentally new contract, but it must also be completely rethought. Europeans are proving this week that they have the tools necessary to step up to the plate, support themselves, and support Ukraine. Europe should certainly expect a reorientation by the Trump administration, especially regarding security. Hopefully, the steps taken by the EU over the past week encourage the United States to remain committed to the health of the US-European partnership. The United States wants a stronger and more capable ally, and if the EU can put real meat on the bones of its announcements this week, then Washington could have just that.
—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.
Further reading
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Image: March 6, 2025, Brussels, Bxl, Belgium: Antonio Costa , the president of European Council , Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ursula Von der Leyen , the president of the European Commission talks to the press prior to European Union Summit at European Council headquarters in Brussels, Belgium on 06/03/2025 to discuss further support for Ukraine and strengthening European defense capabilities. The summit focuses on military aid, increasing ammunition production, and enhancing the EU‚Äôs strategic autonomy in security and defense by Wiktor Dabkowski (Credit Image: © Wiktor Dabkowski/ZUMA Press Wire)